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Executive summary 
 
The Buenos Aires “VotoElectronico” pilot project took place on October 23, 2005, in the 
City of Buenos Aires.  It involved a pilot test of four different electronic voting systems, 
in at least 43 voting stations located throughout the City.  The purpose of this report is to 
provide initial qualitative assessments of the pilot project.  Quantitative analysis will 
hopefully be presented at a later date, once detailed data from the pilot project are 
available for examination. 
 
The key recommendations for the current pilot project evaluation effort and for the 
possible future continuation of this pilot project, made in this report are: 
 
1. Much care is needed in analysis and study of the evaluation data.  
2. Determine the extent of usability problems. 
3. Take a careful look at the optical scanning system.   
4. Develop and implement procedures for physical security.   
5. Develop and implement procedures for pilot testing security.  
6. Continue pilot testing, but narrow down the number of options being tested.  
 
Below, I discuss the pilot project in more detail, provide a detailed discussion of my 
observations, and provide more discussion of these six key recommendations.  Further 
details from the project and from my observations are available at 
http://vote.caltech.edu/Elections2005/BuenosAires/buenos-aires. 
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Project background 
 
The “VotoElectronico” project was the culmination of a research effort that is described 
in background materials provided to the international observation team, and those 
materials are available at the Office of Electoral Affairs, City of Buenos Aires 
(http://www.buenosaires.gov.ar/dgelec).  The international observation team (comprised 
of a large group of observers from across the world, including both public and private 
organizations) participated in a series of meetings on October 21, 2005, including the 
opportunity to examine each of the voting systems that were part of the pilot project.  On 
October 22, the observation team was able to observe the set-up of the electronic pilot 
project systems in two different voting sites.  Last, on October 23 the observing team 
split into two groups, and each group was able to observe both normal polling place 
observations as well as pilot testing at a small number of poll sites located throughout the 
City of Buenos Aires.   
 
During the implementation of the pilot project on October 23, it appears that a great 
quantity of information was collected from project participants: a short questionnaire that 
was given to all participants; a longer questionnaire that was given to a subset of 
participants; data on voting and system performance from the voting systems themselves; 
and qualitative information from the polling place workers participating in the pilot 
project.  This more detailed data will hopefully be available once it is compiled and ready 
for study; at this point, the data at hand are based on qualitative observations made during 
the voting system comparison by the observing team on October 22, observations made 
during the pilot test on October 23, and four graphs of participation data that were 
received immediately after the pilot test via email.  Additional information on the pilot 
project, and the observations of Sean Greene and Dan Seligson of electionline.org, can be 
found in the October 27, 2005 edition of “electionline Weekly”.1 
 
Description of the voting systems 
 
The pilot project was quite ambitious, involving the use of four quite different voting 
systems.  Currently, voters in Argentina use a party-list paper ballot system when they 
vote.  Thus, the voting systems tested here all were developed with the existing 
institutional process of Argentina in mind.   
 
The four different voting systems were developed and built using an innovative 
public/private approach; the open-source software was developed by the public sector 
(within the Office of Electoral Affairs), with the hardware provided by private sector 
firms selected after a bidding process.  The voting system hardware was engineered to fit 
inside a relatively large black metal casing, each voting system thus being approximately 
four feet high.  Examination of the inside of each of the voting devices revealed that each 
involved the integration of a standard off-the-shelf computer system, connected to a 
variety of input devices (the input device thus being the primary source of variation 
                                                 
1http://www.electionline.org/Newsletters/tabid/87/ctl/Detail/mid/643/xmid/160/xmfid/3/Default.aspx. 
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across the voting devices).  As a result, by employing the different voting systems using 
relatively similar external casings, the pilot test team attempted to keep constant any 
technological variables that might have influenced voters participating in the test. 
 
It is important to stress that the four voting systems tested on October 23 are “concept” 
systems --- they are not necessarily designed nor engineered as they might be were they 
used in future elections in Buenos Aires or Argentina.   This pilot test, then can be seen as 
a large-scale “proof of concept” test, involving four different concepts for how voters in 
Buenos Aires (and possibly Argentina) might be able to cast ballots in future elections.   
Further details of the voting systems, including demonstration material provided to the 
observation team, can be found at 
http://vote.caltech.edu/Elections2005/BuenosAires/buenos-aires-docs. 
 
The four different voting systems, as used in the October 23 election, were numbered 
(and provided acronyms) and these numbers will be used in this report to refer to specific 
voting systems.  Voting system 1, which was referred to as the “REA” voting system, 
involved a two-stage process involving the use of a plastic “smart card”.  Voters would 
insert the smart card into a voting system that had a computer screen and a touchpad.  
They would use the keypad to navigate through screens to cast their ballots; when done, 
they removed their smart card, moved to a second machine, and again inserted their smart 
card --- this recorded their vote.   
 
Voting system 2, which the pilot testing team referred to as the “REV” voting system, 
was also an electronic voting device.  However, instead of navigating through the ballot 
with a keypad, voters using this system used a touchscreen to cast their ballot after 
activating the system with their plastic smart card.  When done with their ballot, a paper 
audit trail would be generated underneath a glass screen.  If the voter affirmed that that 
indeed was how she wanted her vote to be cast, the paper audit trail fell into a bin and the 
voter was done; if not, the paper audit trail was rejected and the voter was allowed to cast 
the ballot again.   
 
Voting system 3, which was called “LOB”, was also an electronic voting system, though 
quite different from the previous two.  Here, the voter did not use a plastic smart card to 
active the system and obtain the correct ballots. Instead, inside the voting booth, the voter 
picked paper ballots for the party list she wished to support inside the booth, and inserted 
those ballots into the machine.  The ballots were scanned, and the voter was provided a 
number of opportunities to confirm or reject the party list selection.  After a final 
confirmation screen, the voter’s ballots were accepted and the voter was finished.   
 
Voting system 4, termed “LOP” by the pilot testing team, was an optical scanning voting 
device.  The voter obtained a large paper ballot that contained a list of all the parties 
running candidates for office in each of the two races on the ballot (this lead the ballot to 
be on two very large pieces of paper, connected in the middle with a flexible binding).  
The voter used a special marker to make her selections then folded the ballot so that the 
selections for each race faced each other.  She then inserted the folded ballot (again, 
folded so that her selections could not be seen by others) into the voting device, where it 
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was scanned for mistakes.  If a mistake was detected, an error warning was triggered and 
the poll site worker was to provide another ballot or allow the voter to fix the existing 
ballot; if no mistakes were detected, the ballot was accepted and fell into a ballot box. 
 
Implementation of the pilot test 
 
The pilot test team selected 53 polling locations throughout the City of Buenos Aires to 
participate in the pilot test.  Based on a visual inspection of a map of the City and the 
location of the pilot test sites, it appears that they attempted to locate a pilot test site in 
each part of the City.  According to a briefing provided to the observing team, during the 
two weeks prior to October 23, an information campaign was mounted to contact voters 
and inform them about the pilot project; we were told that this information campaign 
involved letters to voters in pilot test areas, street signs, and attempts to get the local 
media to cover the pilot test.  However, we were informed that in at least one voting site 
that we visited, for some reason letters were not sent to eligible voters.  Also, on Election 
Day we were told that pilot test sites were not operational in at least 9 of the 53 test sites, 
thus possibly reducing the set of pilot test sites to 44.  A histogram of participation rates 
in each pilot test site provided to me via email shows data for only 43 test sites, thus 
indicating that the pilot test might have been conducted in ten fewer sites than originally 
planned.  After more detailed data is provided for the pilot test, it will be possible to more 
accurately ascertain the representativeness of the pilot test sites as planned, and then as 
implemented. 
 
On October 22, the entire international observation team went to two pilot sites to 
observe the set-up of the pilot test site.  These two sites were both schools, one located at 
Av. Lope de Vega 2150 (“ENET No. 35 ING EDUARDO LATZINA”), the second 
located at Av. Santa Fe 2778 (“LIC NAC No.1 JOSE FIGUUEROA ALCORTA”).  On 
October 23 (Election Day), the observation team was split into two groups; the group that 
I was with went to five different pilot test poll sites: 
- 32 “SOCIEDAD RURAL ARGENTINA”, Av. Santa Fe 4201. 
- 38 “ESC No. 25 BANDERA ARG.-EMEM No.6 Padre C. MUJICA”, PJE 
EEUU Del Brasil y Ave. ANT.ARGENTINA. 
- 37 “ESC No. 6 FRENCH Y BERUTI”, Basavilbaso 1295. 
- 32 (again). 
- 42 “ESC No. 21 SOLDADOS ED MALVINAS”, Goleta S. Cruz 6999 
(Gral.PAZ y 2 de ABRIL). 
- 20 “ESC CANGALLO SCHULE”, TTE. Gral. Jan Domingo Peron 2169. 
 
The basic plan of action in each pilot test site was for the site to be set up in an easily 
accessible location, and for some of the pilot test workers to approach voters as they 
came or left the poll site, hand them a brochure, and ask them if they would like to 
participate in the pilot test.  If a voter agreed to participate, they were directed to a 
registration table, where their identification card was checked, and if eligible, they were 
then allocated randomly to one of the four test voting systems.  If the voter needed a 
smart card to operate the voting system they were selected for, they were given that smart 
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card at that point.  The voters were then directed to an information booth for their voting 
system, which had another pilot project worker inside the booth who walked the voter 
through a set of instructions provided on a poster on the wall of the voting booth.  Once 
the voter completed the orientation/information session, they were sent to another voting 
booth where they were given the opportunity to cast a mock ballot for the October 23 
election.  Upon completion of their mock vote, most voters completed a very short 
questionnaire; a randomly selected sample of voters completed a longer questionnaire 
assisted by another poll site worker.  After completion of the survey, the voter returned to 
the registration table where they received their identification materials and then left the 
pilot test site. 
 
Before the pilot test, the test team stated that they hoped to get as many as 20,000 
participants in the pilot test, distributed throughout the 53 pilot test locations in the city.  
However, we were told late in the evening of the election that at least nine of the pilot test 
sites were not in operation on Election Day, apparently having not been allowed to 
operate by uncooperative poll site judges.  But we were also told that evening that as 
many as 14,000 may have participated in the pilot test. 
 
There are some obvious caveats to make at this point regarding this pilot test.  While 
highly ambitious and well designed, there are some potential issues to note at this stage 
before any data are actually analyzed for more detailed project evaluation: 
 
1. This is a very ambitious pilot test, involving four vastly different voting 
systems.  As described above, they differ in many ways, including the basic 
way in which the voter activates the device and receives the correct party-list 
ballots, how voters select their choices and interact with each device, how 
voters confirm and verify their choices, and what they need to do to conclude 
voting.  Some of the voting devices require that the voter manipulate paper, 
others are completely electronic.  Some have keypads for information entry, 
one a touchscreen, and one had no direct data input device for a voter to use.  
Thus these four devices vary widely, on many dimensions, making it difficult 
or even impossible to be able to know with precision exactly what attribute of 
one voting system might lead it to have superior performance over another in 
evaluation testing.   
 
2. According to materials provided to the observing mission, the criteria for pilot 
test site selection are based on a variety of demographic and prior electoral 
participation variables; at this point it is not clear how representative the pilot 
test sites are of the overall population of voting sites in this election 
throughout the City of Buenos Aires. 
 
3. Whether the pilot test sites that were not operational on Election Day were 
somehow systematically different from those that were operational is not clear 
at this point, and could also be a source of potential selection bias. 
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4. Subjects self-selected to participate, and thus there might be selection bias in 
the basic evaluation data.  Also, the pilot test workers (especially those 
observed working in the pilot test sites we attended) were all very young and 
this might serve to influence the type of participant who desired to try the pilot 
voting project.   
 
5. Participants were not casting real ballots, instead were casting mock ballots.  
Thus it is not clear whether voters necessarily had a strong incentive to pay 
attention during the information session, to avoid errors when they voted, and 
to respond accurately to the follow-up surveys.  These are unavoidable issues 
in mock election pilot tests. 
 
6. The potential effects on the pilot test evaluation of the failure of the voter 
education campaign (the observing team was told that the mailings to eligible 
voters in at least one of the pilot site locations were not sent) should be 
assessed and factored into the evaluation.  Also, pilot test workers were 
observed possibly “updating” their voter training as day progressed, and this is 
a factor that should be taken into account (if possible) in evaluation.  Last, the 
observation team went to at least one test site that was understaffed (we were 
told that of the three workers who were supposed to assist with participant 
recruitment, only one arrived; while we were in that pilot test site, that worker 
was off in another location casting his or her own vote, thus leaving the pilot 
site without anyone actively recruiting participants while the observation team 
was there). 
 
These issues do not necessarily make the pilot test meaningless, though paying careful 
attention to testing for potential biases and for employing methods from modern statistics 
to alleviate these potential biases are essential for a meaningful and productive final 
evaluation. 
 
Important observations about usability 
 
During the hands-on evaluation by the observation team on October 22, and in my 
observations of voters using the four voting systems on election day, a number of 
usability issues became clear, some specific to certain voting systems, other more general 
issues.  Of course, as these voting systems are in the conceptual phase, my hope is that 
these observations will help the pilot test team improve these voting systems or focus 
their efforts on a more limited set of voting systems in future tests.   
 
First, and of most importance, there were clear problems with voting system “4”, the 
“LOB” optical scanning device.  Without a more detailed examination of the mechanical 
details of this device, it is hard to determine precisely what the problem was --- usability, 
mechanical problems, computer issues, or some combination of these and other factors.  
Members of the observation team themselves had difficulty using this voting device, as 
during our hands-on testing and during the pilot test on October 23, we observed: 
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- Voters having difficulty inserting the ballot into the device. 
- The device frequently had difficulty accepting a correctly-completed ballot. 
- The device was frequently out of operation on October 23.  
 
Again, the observation team did not have an opportunity to examine the mechanical and 
electronic operations of this device in detail.  One feature of this voting system might 
merit future examination; the optical scan ballot that was used involved heavy stock 
paper, a special marking pen, and the need to fold the voted ballot on top of itself for 
privacy.  These features of the paper optical ballot might make a voted ballot difficult to 
read by an optical device, and thus project team members might examine alternatives to 
this approach, including different optical scanning hardware and the use of different types 
of paper optical scanning ballots (especially the use of a “privacy sleeve” instead of a 
ballot that folds on top of itself). 
 
Second, the two voting devices (systems “1” [“REA”] and “2” [“REV”]) that ask voters 
to interact with the computer screen to navigate their ballot might require some additional 
development.  The specific issue here is how the ballot is rendered on the screen, and the 
sequential way in which voters are asked to work their way through the ballot.  One 
qualitative issue that I observed from some voters on October 23 who used these devices 
was that some wanted to see the entire ballot rendered on one screen; one voter said 
something to the effect that he “wanted to see all of his choices in one place.”  Indeed, in 
party list elections it could be difficult to try to render all of this information in a usable 
way onto a small computer screen.   
 
However, there are both hardware and software solutions to this issue that might be 
considered for further development of these two conceptual voting systems.  A hardware 
solution (potentially expensive) would be to utilize a larger computer screen (especially 
for future development of the non-touchscreen systems), as this would allow for more 
screen space, and thus allow additional information to be presented to voters.  A software 
solution might be to use other types of interfaces for the voter, including interfaces that 
developed by my MIT colleague Ted Selker and his research group, the “LEVI” 
interface; “LEVI” uses clever tools like a menu on the left of the screen, a “fish-eye” 
navigation approach that increased the font size of objects the voter is currently viewing 
larger than the objects not being viewed, and the use of various colors and fonts to 
indicate selections that the voter has made or has yet to make.2    
 
Third, there is clearly more research needed as to how to employ “smart card” technology 
in future voting systems for Buenos Aires voters.  Voters (especially elderly voters) were 
frequently observed having trouble trying to insert their smart card into each of the voting 
systems that used that technology.  Interestingly, there were some voters who appeared to 
try each possible permutation of smart card insertion before getting the “correct” one, 
causing much frustration and slowing down their voting experience.  This appeared to be 
a frequent question or problem for voters in the pilot test. 
                                                 
2 See Selker et al., “Orienting Graphical User Interfaces Reduces Errors:  The Low Error Voting Interface”, 
Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project, VTP Working Paper #23, February 2005, 
http://vote.caltech.edu/media/documents/wps/vtp_wp23.pdf. 
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The education posters for the voting systems using smart cards appeared to not have 
demonstrated the correct use of smart cards, and I did not observe pilot test workers 
demonstrating the use of the smart card to voters (this may have happened, I just did not 
observe it).  Also, it appeared that voting system “1” (“REA”) showed the smart card’s 
insertion on the screen incorrectly, potentially confusing some voters. 
 
Thus, future tests of voting systems involved smart card technologies should focus on a 
more usable process for voters, and should also involve some quick education for voters 
as to how to use the smart card.  For example, having clear and accurate instructions on a 
future voting system about smart card insertion should help, as would having smart card 
instruction before a voter is allowed to use the voting system (for example, if this process 
moves to a point where a single voting system is used in a future pilot or election, voters 
could be walked through a tutorial by a poll site worker after having checked in, but 
before they are allowed to use a “live” voting device). 
 
Fourth, the process used by voting system “1” (“REA”) seemed unnecessarily 
cumbersome, and I could not ascertain why there were independent devices used for 
ballot generation and ballot recording.  There are many potential drawbacks with this 
approach, including that by having more devices in a poll site there are additional points 
of failure and additional potential threats, and that by having multiple steps for a voter 
that they may have additional troubles.  One concern is that some voters in a broader 
implementation may forget the second step, or if a line has formed in front of a ballot 
recording device they may want to skip waiting in line for ballot recording; if this were to 
happen, significant anomalies in the audit logs of the two devices would exist and it 
might be difficult to rectify why additional ballots appeared to be generated relative to the 
number recorded. 
 
Fifth, and more generally, some additional research on usable poll site layout might be 
necessary.  Some of the poll sites that the observing team visited had a well-designed 
layout; there was a clear and linear progression from the check-in point, to the instruction 
booths, to the voting devices, and back to the check-out point.  In other poll sites, the 
layout was confusing and difficult to easily navigate (in some cases this was most likely 
due to the available space for the pilot test in each voting site).  If possible, future pilot 
tests should more closely resemble the existing process used traditionally by Buenos 
Aires voters, with the same type of linear flow from check-in to ballot generation and 
back to check-out.  Also, another aspect of poll site layout that was frequently neglected 
was how to appropriately orient the electrical and computer cables in the poll site; 
exposed cables that were neither well marked nor well anchored were observed in every 
poll site visited in the pre-election period and on Election Day.  In some cases, the 
cabling was left exposed in high traffic areas, posing a physical risk for voters as well as 
a potential risk for security or voting disruptions. 
 
Sixth, some issues arose with regards to the paper audit trail produced by voting system 
“2” (“REV”).  One issue was that some voters clearly did not understand that the paper 
audit trail being produced behind the glass shield was not for them to handle.  In some 
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pilot test sites voters were observed trying to access the paper audit trail by trying to 
remove the glass.  In one pilot test site, a voter had actually removed the glass shield (or 
had broken it); later the observation team noticed that other voters were trying to access 
the paper audit trail as the glass shield was no longer in place.  Clearly this usability issue 
should be resolved with better voter education, both before and during the voting 
experience.    
 
Procedures and security 
 
Observations were made regarding a number of aspects of voting system security, and 
there were a number of different issues that arose, before and during the pilot testing 
project. 
 
Unlike the existing situation, where party-list paper ballots are produced, distributed, and 
counted, movement to a process involving electronic voting devices (both optical 
scanning and electronic voting machines) requires a transition from a largely paper-based 
process to one that is heavily dependent on computers and computer software.  
Accordingly, new procedures to insure the security of these computers and computer 
software should be developed and implemented before additional pilot testing is 
undertaken. 
 
One set of security procedures that should be considered involves the physical security of 
the software development process.  During the pre-election period, the observation team 
noted a relative lack of physical security in the office areas where we were told that 
software development for the pilot test had occurred.  In those office areas, doors were 
open and unlocked, computers were left on, these computers appeared to be connected to 
some type of network or directly to the Internet, and there were windows in these offices 
that were left open.  This was generally true of the election office, as far as the 
observation team could ascertain, that there was not a strong emphasis on physical or 
computer security.  As this was not an important component of the observation team’s 
activities, it is unknown whether this was an anomaly, or standard procedure.   
 
Secondly, during the pre-election set-up period for the pilot testing poll site, there was a 
stronger emphasis placed on physical security, and that access appeared to be strictly 
limited to election officials, polling place workers, the observation team, and the police or 
security forces guarding each pilot test site.  However, once within the site, during the 
poll site set-up the voting devices appeared to be unsealed and not supervised, nor was 
there a process that we observed that required the necessary records to be generated and 
retained to insure that an audit trail was being generated including information as to who 
had access to each component of the pilot test at each moment in time, and whether each 
manipulation required to set up the pilot testing equipment was being logged and 
supervised by multiple poll site workers or election officials.  It was not clear that 
equipment for the pilot testing was being tracked, logged and supervised, at least by 
quick visual inspection in one of the pilot test sites being set up before the election. 
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Third, we witnessed a number of different issues associated with a lack of security 
procedures, or procedures that were not being followed.  In one pilot site we noticed that 
the taped seals had been removed (or had not been installed) from at least two of the pilot 
test machines.  We also observed in one pilot site one of the electronic voting machines 
(system “1”, “REA”) had stopped working; one of the pilot test workers appeared to 
reboot the system a number of times (unsupervised).  I assume that these reboot attempts 
were logged by the system, but as best as I could tell there was no external record created 
as to the poll worker’s manipulations of this voting system, nor were his actions 
supervised by any other poll worker that I noticed.   
 
Fourth, in some pilot test locations the pilot test site’s physical layout made it difficult if 
not impossible for either the pilot test site workers or outside observers to see the voter’s 
actions on the voting machines (note that I am not asserting that the voter’s choices must 
be observed, but instead that any other actions a voter might take may be difficult to 
observe).  For example, without direct line-of-site visual observation of the voter’s use of 
the voting system (again, done in a way that will preserve the voter’s privacy) it might be 
difficult for poll site workers to see situations when voters are having obvious problems 
with the voting technologies.  Clearly the physical layout of the polling places need some 
careful scrutiny in the future, trying to orient the voting technologies to maintain secrecy 
and privacy, while also insuring that the polling place workers can observe any problems 
with the voting systems or attempts to tamper with the voting systems. 
 
However, the pilot test project also has made software running the electronic voting 
technologies available to the public and the observation team, thus adhering to an “open 
source code” ethic.  This is a very important observation to make, and this project should 
be applauded for making their source code available for outside inspection and scrutiny.  
In some ways the open source approach may help mitigate future concerns about security 
of the voting technologies, and may lead to important improvements in the software itself 
if and when outside experts provide feedback about the code upon examination.  I hope 
that the open source approach is maintained as this pilot project moves forward with 
system improvements towards the goal of actual system implementation. 
Key recommendations 
 
1. Much care is needed in analysis and study of the evaluation data.  As noted 
above in this report, there are many questions about the representativeness of the 
data generated by this pilot test project, as well as other concerns about the 
reliability of the data.  Very careful analysis of the pilot test data will be required 
to insure that potential biases are identified, and if possible, mitigated or 
accounted for in the final evaluation analysis.  While the initial report that at least 
14,000 voters participated in the pilot test is good news, it is also the case that 
simply having a very large sample does not make problems like selection bias 
disappear --- it can make it easier to identify and control for, but it cannot be 
ignored even in a large-sample study.   
2. Determine the extent of usability problems.  The two most pressing problems 
in my analysis are the issues associated with the use of smart cards as well as the 
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general failures associated with the optical scan voting system (“LOP”).  It might 
be necessary to conduct further usability tests to resolve the open questions about 
why these issues appeared to arise with such regularity during the pilot testing.   
3. Take a careful look at the optical scanning system.  However, I do not think 
that because significant issues arose during the testing of the optical scan voting 
technology that it should be removed from consideration at this point.  While 
analysis of the evaluation data might lead to a different conclusion, at this point it 
would be worthwhile to work to improve the “LOP” voting system, if the 
problems can be isolated, and have an improved optical scan system undergo 
some form of future (perhaps more limited) additional testing. 
4. Develop and implement procedures for physical security.  Before additional 
system development and testing is initiated, I recommend that additional security 
procedures be developed and implemented to increase the physical security during 
system revision and development.  These would include, but not be limited to, 
stronger office security, removing critical development systems from local- or 
wide-area networks, and developing systems for monitoring, logging, and 
supervising assess to locations where system revision and development occurs.  It 
is also important for me to stress that the project development team’s emphasis on 
open-source software is commendable, and it should continue to be an underlying 
feature of future system development. 
5. Develop and implement procedures for pilot testing security.  In future pilot 
tests, methods and procedures for poll site security should be developed and 
implemented.  These should include documentation of all contact that poll 
workers have with voting technology, external logging of all manipulations of 
voting technology (during set-up, balloting, and end-of-election activities), and 
supervision of all manipulations of the voting technology by multiple poll 
workers or observers.   
6. Continue pilot testing, but narrow down the number of options being tested.  
As I noted at the beginning of this report, the pilot testing conducted by the City 
of Buenos Aires on October 23, 2005 was highly ambitious and well designed.  It 
involved the testing of four very different voting systems, in a planned 53 sites 
throughout the city.  The downside of such an ambitious pilot test is that there are 
many variables here that differ, across the four very different voting devices, 
across the poll sites, and even perhaps over the course of election day.  It will be 
difficult to control for all of these variables in an evaluation, not matter what the 
size of the participant sample, especially when there are other issues like self-
selection to deal with.  Hopefully the just-conducted pilot test will help the 
development team focus on a smaller range of voting system variations for future 
testing, so that these future tests can be more tightly controlled and thus that 
treatment effects (variation across voting systems) can be more easily identified.   
 
 
 
